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I.

Introduction
A.

Recent literature on "privatization" of resources
emphasizes the advantages of private ownership and
market exchange over bureaucratic control and allocation:
1. Stroup and Baden (1983) emphasized the rigidities
of nontransferable public rights in resources and
the inefficiencies of bureaucratic resource
management in energy, groundwater, and timber.
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2.

Rent seeking under government agency programs has
been analyzed by
a.

Gardner (1983) and Rucker and Fishback (1983)
for water;

b.

Libecap (1978; 1982; 1984; 1986) for minerals, rangelands, and petroleum;

c.

Deacon and Johnson (1985) for forestry.

3. Anderson (1983a, b) has analyzed the transition of
western water rights from early (mining) appropriations doctrine to the concept of "beneficial
use."
B. The establishment of markets is usually inhibited in
the presence of pervasive externalities, such as water
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pollution or changes in return flows. The sale of
water nearly always has positive and/or negative direct

impacts on third parties. Yet, fairly extensive
markets have developed for water, and these markets,
while sometimes involving rather high transaction
costs, appear to have been successful in tranferring
water from lower-valued to higher-valued uses over
time.
C. It is increasingly important that existing water
supplies be allocated more efficiently than in the
past because:
1.

New water project costs are high:
a.

$200 per acre foot for the Bureau of Reclamation's Animas-LaPlata Project in Colorado and
New Mexico (Howe);

b.

$450 per acre foot projected for the State
Water Project in California (Wahl, 1985).

2.

Climatic changes, such as the CO2-induced greenhouse effect, may decrease runoff by as much as
76% for the Rio Grande (National Research Council,
1983).

D. This paper will identify characteristics that would be
generally desirable for resource allocation mechanisms
and argue that, for water, markets often possess more
of these characteristics than their alternatives, even
within the existing federal and state legal frameworks.
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II. Desirable Characteristics of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
and Their Implications for Water Markets
A. We are interested in comparing the likely behavior of
alternative mechanisms for allocating resources among
users at the regional, river basin, or conservancy
district level, invoking six criteria derived from
theory and experience:
1.

Flexibility in the allocation of existing water
supplies. Water needs to be shifted from use to
use and place to place as climate, demographic,
and economic conditions change over time. Both
long and short-term flexibility is needed. To be
operationally flexible, it is not necessary that
all water be subject to reallocation, only that
there exist a tradable margin within each major
water-using area that is subject to low-cost
reallocation.

2.

Security of tenure for established users. Only if
the water user can be assured of continued use
will the user invest in and maintain water-using
systems.

3.

Confronting the user with the real opportunity
cost of the resources available for his use.

4.

Predictability of the outcome of the process.
Change to a new allocative process, while promising some advantages, may increase uncertainty

about the outcome. Many persons fear water
markets because they cannot anticipate how
extensive the reallocation (especially from
agriculture to cities) might be.
5.

A water allocation process should be perceived by
the public as equitable or fair. For example,
water users should not impose uncompensated costs
on other parties.

6.

A socially responsible water allocation process
must be capable of reflecting public values that
may not be adequately considered by individual
water users. For example water quality and
instream flow maintenance may generate large
public good values that may be of little concern
to individual water users.

B.

The above criteria correspond rather closely to
economic efficiency, going beyond the Hicks-Kaldor
definition by including a requirement for equity or
fairness.

C.

We argue that markets meet the above six criteria
better than their likely alternatives in many situations, but markets have shortcomings too:
1.

Property rights in water are, in practice,
difficult to define with precision.

Under

appropriation doctrine in the western United
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States, the right is a usufructory right: a right

I"

to use, but not ownership;
2.

What constitutes beneficial use changes with time
and may even be uncertain at a point in time.

3.

Connection of a given use to other users via
return flow quantity and quality creates added
uncertainty regarding the water right owner's
ability to change uses or points of diversion.

4.

Market prices may fail to reflect full opportunity
costs because of geographical limits to the market
and by ignoring negative externalities.

5.

Markets may not be as predictable as allocation
through long-term contract or through water use
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licensing, at least not as predictable to those
parties who have traditionally received their
water under such arrangements.
6.

Markets do not guarantee fairness to third parties
who may be negatively impacted by a market
exchange, e.g. persons indirectly left unemployed
as a result of the termination of irrigated
agriculture.

7.

Markets are likely to understate public good
values such as instream flow values because most
state laws do not count instream uses as beneficial uses. Idaho, Montana, and Colorado (and now
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also Utah and Wyoming) allow the state government

to file for or purchase water rights to be
dedicated to instream uses (Gardner, 1985;
Costello and Cole, 1985). Howe and Lee (1983)
have argued that one of the best means of protecting instream flows would be to extend this
capability to local governments.

III. Strengthening the Weaknesses of Water Markets
A. The main administrative problem in water markets is the
existence of "third-party" effects that take the forms
of changed return flows, changed groundwater levels,
and water quality changes.
1.

The main issue in making markets work more
efficiently is to identify and quantify these
effects accurately and quickly and to get agreement on their magnitudes so that compensation
and/or adjustments to the original property rights
can be carried out without excessive transaction
costs.

2.

In New Mexico the identification of third-party
effects is carried out by the State Engineer's
office, which also proposed modifications to the
right being transferred that should make the
transfer acceptable to all parties. In most
cases, these recommendations are accepted by all
parties. In contrast, the court trial process is
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costly, time-consuming, and fails to produce the
best analysis of the case. Court modification of
rights to prevent third-party damages can result
in a large reduction in benefits to buyer and
seller to avoid only small losses to third
parties.
3. Water law is asymmetric in its treatment of
third-party gains and losses in that return flows
are considered to be available for reappropriation
by others and no payment can be claimed by the
creator of the new flow.
B. Another problem in water markets is the difficulty of
communication among potential buyers and sellers that
results from wide geographical separation.
1.

Individual farmers and small towns may have
difficulty locating buyers or sellers;

2.

Water conservancy districts with professinal
staffs may be able to help make markets;

3.

Some states are developing satellite-based real
time streamflow data systems that should permit
the State Engineer's Office to assist in making a
market (Simpson, 1984).

4.

Such services might be provided by private
brokers, but the market is likely to be too thin
to be profitable for any group that doesn't
already exist for other purposes.
7

C.

A third problem is the protection of those public good
values generated by instream flows and higher water
quality. In a dynamic setting where town, county, and
state governments could buy water rights on behalf of
their citizens, these problems would not be as severe
as implied by the literature (see Howe and Lee, 1983).

D.

Water quality has generally been handled by administrative systems that are totally separate from the
allocation of water quantity. In recent years,
substantial interest has arisen in the concept of
transferable, marketable pollution permits (see Joeres
and David, 1983). Under such a system a number of
permits for the various pollutants consistent with the
specified ambient standards are issued or auctioned to
polluters. Thereafter, these permits may be traded
within the same pollution basin. Such a system is in
use in the Fox River Basin in Wisconsin, the amounts of
pollution permitted by each permit being a function of
the current assimilative capacity of the stream (O'Neil
et al., 1983).

IV. Types of Property Rights in Water and Their Effects on
Market Functioning
A. Property rights in water can be completely described
only by a definition covering the quantity diverted and
consumed, timing, quality, and places of diversion and
8

application. The more detailed the definition of the
property right, the greater

will

be the heterogeneity

among rights. This in turn will increase buyers'
search costs and other transaction costs, since markets
operate most efficiently when the commodity being
allocated is homogeneous.
B. Two main types of ownership rights in water quantity
have evolved under appropriations doctrine: priority
rights and proportional rights. Priority and proportional systems do have unique advantages in some
settings. Table 1 summarizes the comparative advantages and disadvantages of priority and proportional
water rights systems.

TABLE I. A Comparison of Some Characteristics of Priority and
Proportional Rights Systems
Priority Rights
General
advantage

Proportional Rights

Different degrees of
Rights are homogeneous,
supply reliability
easier to establish
can be purchased
market
General
Rights non-homogeneous, Differing degrees of
disadvantage more difficult to
reliability must be
organize market
created by holding
extra shares
When users
Short-run inefficiencies
Efficient allocation
are alike
during water shortages
among users during
shortage
When users
Prevents extreme loss
Either excessive losses
are not
to sensitive users
to water sensitive
alike
during shortage but
users during shortage
generates some shortor sensitive users must
term inefficiencies due
hold extra shares
to marginal products
not being equal
When water
Protects sensitive invest- Makes protection of
supply is
ments but results in
sensitive investments
highly
some short-term
difficult but equates
variable
inefficiencies
marginal values when
users are alike

C.

Economic analysis shows that:
1.

Optimal water allocation cannot be determined
independently from water quality considerations.

2.

An optimal water allocation rule is generally
neither a priority rule nor a proportional rule.

3.

If short term water markets (rental markets) work
efficiently, the type of water right may not be
important.

V.

The Potential for Expanded Markets
A. Flexibility in a water allocation system implies that
it is desirable to maximize the scope of the market so
that useful transactions can take place over as wide a
geographical area and among as wide a variety of
participants as possible.
1.

The size of the market is limited by transfer
costs and by transaction costs, i.e. by the costs
of channeling the water from one place to another
and of gathering information, putting buyers and
sellers in contact, and legally effecting transfers.

2.

The tradable margin need not be large to provide
the needed flexibility.

3.

Since more localized markets such as those within
water conservancy districts (WCDs) have been
active for many years in the West, some of the
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greatest opportunities for increased efficiency
lie in interdistrict and interstate markets,
A.

An excellent example of efficient market arrangements
is found in Northeastern Colorado.
1.

The federal Colorado-Big Thompson (C-BT) was
started in 1937 and completed in 1957 to bring
supplemental irrigation water from the western
side of the Rocky Mountains to Northeastern
Colorado. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District (NCWCD) was established to contract with
the federal government for purchase of the water,
repayment of project costs, and distribution of
the water to final users (see Maass and Anderson,
1978; C. W. Howe et al., unpublished manuscript,
1982). C-BT has provided an historical average of
2.83 x 10 8 m 3 (230,000 acre-feet) or about 17% of
the total water supply of the region. While this
supply is primarily for supplemental irrigation,
towns and a growing number of industries use C-BT
as a raw water supply. This supply represents the
easily tradable margin needed to provide flexibility in allocation.

2.

The area encompassed by NCWCD included areas of
quite different natural water supplies in relation
to the amount of arable land. Potential users did
not want a mandatory, uniform assignment of water
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to the land. These sentiments led in 1957 to a
system in which water was to be delivered to the
owners of NCwCD shares, a share representing a
freely transferable contract between the District
and the holder entitling the holder to 1/310,000th
of the water available to NCWCD (this has averaged
approximately 863.8 m 3 (1.7 acre-feet) of water
per year). The transferable nature of the
allotments stimulated the creation of a market in
which they could be traded.
3.

Much of the water needed for urban and nonagricultural industrial growth has been provided by the
sale of NCWCD allotments from agriculture. These
nonagricultural users often "rent" excess water
back to irrigation on a short-term (annual)
basis. About 30% of the C-BT water is involved in
rental transactions each year, with towns being
big renters of water to agriculture.

4.

Third-party and instream flow problems have not
been solved in NCWCD, but they have been evaded.
The complexities and high transaction costs
imposed on most water transfers by possible
third-party intervention have been evaded because
the District has retained title to all return
flows.
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5. While the NCWCD market arrangements ignore return
flow effects, they allow greater flexibility than
alternative water distribution mechanisms.
Transaction costs are certainly lower than for
transfers under state laws, which frequently
involve court trials. Flexibility is greater than
under some Bureau of Reclamation contracts that
prohibit water transfers from specific land
parcels. Security of tenure is greater than that
found under administrative procedures, such as
those found in the Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, where water is reallocated
annually by the Board of Directors (see Hartman
and Seastone, 1970, Chapter VI). The possibility
of easily and advantageously replicating these
NCWCD market structures in other project areas
warrants serious consideration.
B. The status of potential interstate water sales by
either private appropriators or public bodies is in a
state of legal flux.
1. It seems clear from Sporhase v. Nebraska (1982)
and City of El Paso v. Reynolds that blanket
prohibitions of interstate transfers are unconstitutional, but the necessary conditions for
legality of sales have not become clear.
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2.

The answers to many questions are yet unknown:
a.

Must the water be confined to a pipeline?

b.

Is

it sufficient that it be part of a larger

product (chicken soup or coal slurry)?
c.

Can water sold be allowed to remain in the
stream to be abstracted downstream by the
buyer?

d.

Can a state government lease part of the
water allocated to it under interstate
compact but not currently used (e.g. waters
unappropriated under state water law or held
by the state for state uses)?

e.

Would interstate water leases or sales help
affirm the titles to such waters?

f.

Would there be a market for such water?

g.

Against which state's compact allotment would
such transactions be counted?

h.

Would California, which has been using waters
unused in Colorado and Arizona for many
decades, be willing to pay something for a
longer-term lease that would assure continued
delivery for a known period?

i.

Would the availability of such arrangements
eliminate the pressure for nonsensical
"use it or lose it" projects?
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j

What will be the status of water allocated to
the Indian Tribes under federal reservation
doctrine and Winter's decree?

C.

These questions require timely, objective research and
the application of that research to state policy
formulation. Recent proposals for interstate leases
have prompted uninformed negative reactions for several
states.

D.

The potential gains from an expanded role for water
markets warrant a high priority for research on
procedures for expanding their role. The payoff will
be much higher than from the continuation of inefficient allocative practices of the past and from the
attempts to find ever more new supplies.
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